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BEYOND THE CONTROL PARADIGM? INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Gleider I Hernández* 
 From the perspective of public international law, the legal personality of the European 
Union carries with it the possibility for the Union to exercise rights and to bear obligations 
on the international plane. The Union’s quasi-federal structure, however, requires 
consideration as to how these rights and obligations may be exercised. In this piece, two 
regimes are compared: the Union’s rights and obligations as an international organisation, 
and the possibility that the Union’s internal structures might be recognised on the 
international plane, thus leading to more complex notions of subsidiary responsibility, shared 
between the various levels of European governance. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Legal personality may be primarily a technical question, but in the case of the European 
Union, it represents a claim to a coherent identity on the international plane; with respect to 
third States, it represents a willingness to assume responsibility. Within public international 
law, the accommodation of the European Union’s desire (and purpose, as expressed in the 
treaties) to act collectively has raised interesting questions with respect to the Union’s 
external legal personality and the accommodation of this desire within the international legal 
order. 
The question is not merely semantic: if the European Union structures are in fact closer 
to a federation of States as is often claimed by European Union legal scholars,
1
 then scholarly 
treatment of the European Union as an international actor cannot be limited by a dogmatic 
insistence that it is a ‘mere’ international organisation. At the heart of this study is an attempt 
to think a bit more broadly about the precise place of the European Union at international 
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1
 R Schütze, ‘On “Federal” Ground: The European Union as an (Inter)national Phenomenon’ (2009) 46 CML 
Rev 1105, 1105; cf A Dashwood, ‘The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/ 
Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 355, 356 (‘a federation of sovereign States’).  
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law. Although the Union’s genesis as an international organisation2 is a necessary starting-
point of the analysis, increasing constitutionalist and federalist structures at the European 
level suggest that evolution in the Union’s purpose and functions also require some 
reflections at the international level. To this end, two specific features of the Union’s 
international personality, its treaty-making power and its responsibility for internationally 
wrongful acts, will be considered here. The major question in this study relates to the 
international legal effects of the internal allocation of competences between the European 
Union and the Member States, and whether they are to be understood through the control 
paradigms favoured by the International Law Commission in its 2011 Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO).
3
 Accordingly, this paper will consider 
whether the (limited) accommodation of federal structures within international law can 
extend to the Union, or whether a special regime drawing from both paradigms can be 
elucidated in respect of it. Some final reflections on the nature of shared responsibility will 
conclude this piece.  
A note on terminology: purely for linguistic consistency, this study uses the term 
‘European Union’ broadly, as the all-embracing entity within which all European integration 
has taken place. Since its entry into force in 2009, Article 1(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon
4
 
provides that the EU ‘shall replace and succeed the European Community’, and as such the 
Union is the successor entity to the previously-existing international personality of the EC 
with respect to the first pillar, even as it expands that international personality throughout the 
Union’s work.5 The most important provision in European law is Article 47 of the Treaty of 
                                                 
2
 Ibid, 1079: the Union’s ‘birth certificate’ is an international treaty. 
3
 Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session, UN Doc A/66/10, in (2011) Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission vol II, pt 2 (hereinafter ‘ARIO’ or the ‘Articles’). 
4
 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (signed 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009), [2010] OJ C83/01, art 47. 
5
 And thus to the EC’s treaty-making power: Select Committee on European Union, The Treaty of Lisbon: An 
Impact Assessment (Tenth Report) (HL 2008, 62-I), evidence of Sir Francis Jacobs to the House of Lords, Select 
Committee, S148. See also: R Schütze (n 1) 1105, fn 2. 
 3 
Lisbon: ‘The Union shall have legal personality’. Although this provision is primarily of a 
confirmatory nature, resolving the debates as to the Union’s legal personality from 1992 until 
2009,
6
 it confirms what is generally viewed as a legal reality and establishes a series of legal 
and practical implications. As such, for the purposes of this paper, there is no need to 
distinguish between the two, given that the treaty obligations of the former Community are 
now assumed by the European Union.
7
 Thus, the term ‘European Community’ or ‘EC’ will 
be used purely in its historical context, to refer to legal arrangements and practices made prior 
to the succession of the Community by the Union. 
 
II. THE UNION’S RELEVANT LEGAL STRUCTURES: INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY, JUS 
TRACTATUUM 
A. The International Personality of the European Union 
Since the ECJ’s famous judgment in Van Gend en Loos, the European legal order has been 
described as a ‘new legal order of international law’.8 With respect to the division of powers 
between the Member States and the principal organs of the Union, this is relevant; and a great 
many competences are expressly recognised within the framework of the EC treaties as 
falling exclusively with the EC and not with Member States.
9
 Since the succession of the EU 
                                                 
6
 Prior to 2009, only the European Community had legal personality: see art 281 of the Consolidated Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities (previously art 210 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community) (signed 25 March 1957, entered into force 1 January 1958) [2006] OJ C321/E/37 (hereinafter ‘EC 
Treaties’). For a review of the evolution of the Union’s personality vis-à-vis that of the Community between 
1992 and 2007 see D McGoldrick, ‘The International Legal Personality of the European Community and the 
European Union’ in M Dougan and S Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and 
Thinking Forward (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 181, 195–201. 
7
 This is confirmed in a series of succession letters that the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission sent jointly to the EU’s treaty partners and the depositaries of multilateral conventions at the end of 
2009.  
8
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, para 12. The 
‘international’ has in fact been dropped in later formulations: see D McGoldrick (n 6) 182. 
9
 The breadth of these areas exceeds the scope of this study, but they are as follows. Some articles in the EC 
Treaty (n 6) made express provision for the EC to enter into international agreements: those relating to common 
commercial policy (art 133 EC), ‘association agreements’ with third States (art 310 EC), the environment (art 
174 EC), development cooperation (art 181 EC), monetary or foreign exchange regime matters (art 111 EC), 
education, vocational training and youth (art 149(3) and 150 EC), culture and public health (art 151 EC), and 
research and technological development (art 170 EC).  
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to the EC, further rights and obligations have been added to these legal bases for the Union’s 
competence.
10
 
When acting externally, first the Community and now the Union was represented by the 
Commission, which negotiated on the basis of authorisation from the Council, which would 
then conclude the agreements in its own name.
11
 With respect to treaties under which it has 
been allowed to become a party, the Community’s practice was always to deposit and express 
statement of its competence with respect to that treaty.
12
 For those conventions relating to 
subjects over which the EC had competence, but where membership is limited only to States, 
under Community law the Member States parties to that treaty were effectively acting as 
‘trustees’ for the Community.13 These practices have continued under the Union. 
Interestingly, most such agreements grant rights and impose duties on the Member States, 
and not on the Union separately, thus avoiding proceedings and claims involving the Union 
directly.
14
 This suggests that primary responsibility rests predominantly with the Member 
States, and perhaps with European Union institutions; but responsibility with the Union as 
such has not been the intention of the Member States. For the purposes of international 
                                                 
10
 Article 216, para 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (signed 18 December 2007, 
entered into force 1 December 2009) [2008] OJ C115/47 is the general provision, allowing the EU to conclude 
an agreement with one or more third States or an international organisation where the treaties provide, or where 
the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, 
one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope. Art 217 allows the EU to conclude association agreements; Art 207 
TFEU allows it to conclude treaties on common commercial policy; Art 218 TFEU subsumes art 300 of the EC 
Treaty and art 24(6) of the pre-2007 TEU (foreign policy treaties); and art 219 of the TFEU makes provision for 
negotiations and conclusion of international agreements concerning economic and monetary union. 
Several specific provisions also allow this: see eg art 8 of the revised TEU, on developing special relationships 
with neighbouring States, art 37 allowing the Union to conclude agreements with States or international 
organiations in areas covered by the CFSP; Art 79(3) TFEU, on concluding agreements with third States for the 
readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals; Art 209 TFEU, relating to the 
objectives referred to in art 21 TFEU, on the Union’s external action, and art 208 TFEU, on development 
cooperation; Art 214 TFEU, on humanitarian aide. 
11
 Article 300 EC Treaty (n 6). See P Eeckhout, Relations of the European Union, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 170. 
12
 A Aust, The Modern Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 140. 
13
 A term borrowed from M Cremona, ‘Member States as Trustees of the Union Interest: Participating in 
International Agreements on Behalf of the European Union’ in: A Arnull, C Barnard, M Dougan and E Spaventa 
(eds) A Constitutional Order of States: Essays in European Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 435. 
14
 D McGoldrick (n 6) 202. 
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personality, it seems that the jus tractatuum is treated separately from responsibility arising 
under the obligations so assumed.  
From the outset, the European Union/Community’s treaty-making power was limited to 
areas within their competence.
15
 Yet the European Court of Justice has, over the years, 
expanded the Community’s treaty-making powers to a wide variety of areas under its 
competence through the doctrine of ‘parallel external powers’,16 not dissimilar to the Belgian 
in foro interno, in foro externo principle that will be addressed below. According to the 
parallel competences principle, first articulated in the famous ERTA
17
 and Opinion 1/76
18
 
judgments, and now codified in Art 3(2) TFEU,
19
 the competence of the European 
Union/Community to enter into international agreements was deemed to run in parallel to the 
development of its competence over certain spheres internally.
20
 The parallel external powers 
doctrine also entails that, within European law at least, EU Member States are deprived of 
their treaty-making power to the extent that its exercise will affect internal European law.
21
 
Member States, under such a scenario, would act as ‘agents’, or even ‘trustees’22 of the 
Union. 
                                                 
15
 At that time, international agreements under the Common Commercial Policy and Association Agreements 
with third States or international organisations: see arts 113 and 238 of the 1958 EC Treaty (n 6). 
16
 See generally R Schütze, ‘Parallel External Powers in the European Community: From “Cubist” Perspectives 
towards “Naturalist” Constitutional Principles?’ [2004] 23 Yearbook of European Law 225. 
17
 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, para 90: ‘In carrying on the negotiations and 
concluding the agreement simultaneously in the manner decided on by the Council, the Member States acted, 
and continue to act, in the interest and on behalf of the Community in accordance with their obligations under 
article 5 of the Treaty’. 
18
 Opinion 1/76 re Draft Agreement establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels 
[1977] ECR 741. 
19
 Article 3(2) TFEU (n 10) grants the European Union an exclusive external competence where an international 
agreement ‘is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence’. 
20
 In Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paras 15–6, 23–7, the treaty-making power of 
the Community was presumed as an additional instrument to implement the Community’s competence under the 
common transport policy. See also Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No 170) [1993] ECR I-1061, paras 15–17, 
where the very fact of the Union’s internal competence to adopt social provisions was sufficient to imply an 
external power to conclude international treaties on all such purposes. 
21
 Ibid, para 18. See also: R Schütze, ‘Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Mixity as an (Inter)national 
Phenomenon’ in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: the EU and its Member States 
in the World (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 57, 77. 
22
 See generally: M Cremona (n 13): the ‘trustees’ doctrine there articulated suggests that, when the Union 
cannot act externally because it lacks the capacity to act internationally, its Member States must conclude or 
amend international agreements on its behalf. 
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What is relevant for our purposes is that the European Union/Community as an actor 
has consistently asserted its right to act internationally in all policy areas falling within its 
competence, and asserted an autonomous identity and capacity to act on the international 
plane.
23
 The right to do so has been upheld by the ECJ.
24
 Given the express provision of 
Article 47 of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is no need to consider whether the Union has any 
sort of ‘implicit’ personality. In any event, even before 2007, the European Community 
engaged in extensive international practice, concluding well over fifty UN multilateral 
conventions
25
 and acceding to various international organisations, including the World Trade 
Organisation.
26
 The European Union’s practice has generally related to its powers under 
security and defence under Article 24 TEU, concluded its first agreement in April 2011, with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
27
 and has since concluded well over 70 agreements on 
the basis of its competence under Article 24 TEU.
28
 It has also entered into agreements with 
international organisations
29
 and certain third States;
30
 more recently, it has ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
31
 That it is active is thus not open to 
serious question; and what needs to be addressed is the legal framework through which such 
acts must be tested. 
                                                 
23
 See J d’Aspremont, ‘A European Law of International Responsibility? The Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations and the European Union’, in V Kosta, N Skoutaris and V Tzevelekos (eds), The EU 
Accession to the ECHR (Oxford, Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2014). Available at: ssrn.com/abstract=2236070, 
2. 
24
 Most prominently in Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, para 14. For further 
discussion, see P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006), 77 et seq. 
25
 Ibid, 137–81, where Koutrakos enumerates these. In some of these cases, it is sole party to the treaties, whilst 
in other cases it is a party alongside some or all of the Member States.  
26
 See Opinion 1/94 re WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267, discussed in P Eeckhout (n 11), 27–35 and 87–95.  
27
 Status of Mission Agreement, [2001] OJ L125/2. See also: A Sari, ‘Status of Forces and Status of Mission 
Agreements under the EDSP: The EU’s Evolving Practice’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 
67. 
28
 R Gosalbo Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 337. 
29
 See EU-NATO Agreement of 14 March 2003, [2003] OJ L80/35; and EU-ICC Agreement of 10 April 2006, 
[2006] OJ L115/50. 
30
 See EU-EC-Switzerland Schengen Association Agreement of 2004 (and Protocol on the Accession of 
Liechtenstein of 2006) and EU-EC-Iceland-Norway Schengen Association Agreements of 1999. 
31
 See International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities, GA Res 61/106, Annex I, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, at 65, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006), 
entered into force May 3, 2008. 
 7 
B. Consequences of International Personality of the European Union 
It is a truism that any entity possessing international legal personality possesses rights and 
duties under international law. When applied to the European Union, the legal personality as 
separate from that of its Member States entails that the Union have international rights and 
obligations distinct from those of its members.
32
 It is clear that sovereignty is not required in 
order to hold international legal personality, as explained the International Court of Justice 
with respect to the legal personality of the United Nations,
33
 which derives its international 
personality from its capacities and obligations under international law. The ICJ there was 
careful to emphasise that international legal personality can be objective, in that entities can 
exist within the international legal system even in relation to other entities which have not 
consented to their existence (in that case, States not parties to the United Nations Charter): 
[F]ifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had 
the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective 
international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with 
capacity to bring international claims.
34
  
 
However, there are two important distinctions to be drawn. First, unlike the essentially 
regional nature of the European Union, the UN’s international personality was derived from 
the near-universal participation of States then existing, drawn from all continents, regions and 
cultural groups: it was a genuine public international organisation. Secondly, the ICJ’s 
conclusion as to the international personality of the UN was of that of an international 
organisation, with functional personality based on the powers that had been accorded to it by 
contracting States. No-one contests that such personality would accrue to the European 
                                                 
32
 C Tomuschat, ‘The International Responsibility of the EU’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The EU as an Actor in 
International Relations (Kluwer, The Hague, 2002), 177. 
33
 As the ICJ noted in Reparation for Injuries, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1948, 174, international 
personality is the ‘capacity to be titular to international rights and obligations’, concluding ultimately, 179, that 
the United Nations, as an international organisation with ‘objective international personality’, also was the 
bearer of rights and duties under international law. This rather expansive definition also admits that subjects of 
international law need not be identical in their nature; nor must their rights and obligations be of the same kind 
and extent. 
34
 Reparation for Injuries (n 33), 185. 
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Union; it is the special status that some seek to accord the Union under international law that 
is problematic.  
The next sections will therefore consider, respectively, the standard regime for the 
responsibility of international organisations, as adopted by the International Law 
Commission’s recently adopted Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the ‘Articles’ or ‘ARIO’)35, before turning to the Union’s 
claims for a sui generis or special status.  
 
III. APPORTIONING RESPONSIBILITY: EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ILC ARTICLES ON THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
A. General Rules: Setting the Scene 
It is a basic principle of responsibility at international law that a breach of an international 
obligation that is attributed to an international legal person entails the responsibility of that 
person for the breach. This principle is codified both in the ASR and in the ARIO.
36
 Such 
breaches, if they constitute an act or omission that is attributable to the international 
organisation, constitute an internationally wrongful act of that organisation.
37
 Although many 
of the Articles broadly transpose principles already existing in relation to the responsibility of 
States, the most important general rules on attribution are contained in Article 6, paragraphs 1 
and 2, according to which the conduct of organs or agents of an international organisation are 
attributed to that organisation if such conduct is in the performance of their functions. Any 
analysis of this is generally – but not exclusively – done in accordance with the rules of that 
                                                 
35
 Above (n 33). It has been suggested by S Talmon, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the 
European Community Require Special Treatment?’ in M Ragazzi (ed) International Responsibility Today: 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (The Hague, Brill, 2005) 412, that a similar provision to Article 5 ASR 
should be embodied in the DARIO, whereby situations where the conduct of member States, when acting as 
‘agents’ of international organisations, would entail the attribution of such conduct to the organisation itself.  
36
 Article 2 ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 
in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add 1, in (2001) Yearbook of the International Law Commission vol II, pt 2 (hereinafter 
‘ASR’ or the ‘Articles on State Responsibility’). With respect to international organisations, this principle is 
codified in art 4, para 2, of the ARIO (n 3). 
37
 Article 4, para (b), ARIO (n 3).  
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organisation.
38
 Another important rule is contained in Draft Article 7, which allows for the 
conduct of an organ or agent of a State placed at the disposal of an international organisation 
to become attributable only to the receiving organisation.  
Although it is true that in the European legal order, a Member State can act as an organ 
of the Union,
39
 this view has been expressly rejected on the international plane by the 
International Law Commission under Article 60 ARIO.
40
 Member States of the European 
Union thus do not constitute organs or agents of the Union on the international legal plane. 
Nor can acts of Member States be considered to be ‘at the disposal’ of the European Union 
through the mere operation of European law: there must be ‘factual control that is exercised 
over the specific conduct taken by the organ or agent placed at the receiving organization’s 
disposal’.41 
The consequences of the agency principle embodied in Draft Articles 6 and 7 remain 
unclear. Take, for example, the issue raised in relation to actions by States parties to the 
ECHR performed as part of UN peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. In Behrami and 
Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway,
42
 the issue arose of the 
attribution of the acts of Member States to the international organisation (in this case, the 
United Nations); it was claimed that these were acting as agents of the international 
organisation. Although operational command remained with KFOR and the participating 
States, the European Court attributed the acts being challenged to the United Nations, given 
                                                 
38
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 6, 19, para 9: the rules of the organisation are not the only criterion, 
leaving open the possibility that in exceptional circumstances, functions may be considered as given to an organ 
or agent even if this is not based on the rules of the organization. 
39
 See eg E Paasivirta and PJ Kuijper, ‘Does One Size Fit All? The European Community and the Responsibility 
of International Organizations’ (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 169, 192. 
40
 Gaja suggested that this internal view went against the case law of the European Court of Human Rights: see 
International Law Commission (G Gaja Special Rapporteur), Seventh Report on Responsibility of International 
Organisations (27 March 2009), UN Doc A/CN.4/2009, 12-13 (para 33), he invoked Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR, 30 June 1995) para 153 and Joined Cases 
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I-06351, para 313. In his 8th Report, A/CN.4/640, 37, he invoked the Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands App no 
13645/05 (ECtHR, 20 January 2009). 
41
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 7, para 2. 
42
 Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, Admissibility Decision App 
nos 71412/01 and 78166/01, (ECtHR, 2 May 2007). 
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that KFOR’s mandate emanated from ‘delegated’ powers of the Security Council according 
to Chapter VII.
43
 Pursuant to this finding, the ECHR declared the claim inadmissible ratione 
personae, in a judgment very much criticised by the ILC.
44
 The basic criticism of the ILC is 
that the European Court incorrectly applied the ‘effective control’ test envisaged by it in a 
previous version of the ARIO. According to the ILC, when applying the criterion of effective 
control, ‘operational control’ over a specific act should have been more significant than 
‘ultimate’ control: ‘the latter hardly implies a role in the act in question’.45 
There are, however, a number of other specific rules on the responsibility of an 
international organisation that would not be limited to States acting as its organs or its agents. 
Articles 14 to 19 ARIO concern the responsibility of international organisations when their 
conduct is connected to the act of a State or another international organisation. Article 14 
acknowledges the indirect responsibility of an international organisation for the breach of 
international law for aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. 
Such aid or assistance of the international organisation must be ‘significant’.46 Article 15 
suggests that an international organisation which directs and controls a State in the 
commission of the internationally wrongful act is internationally responsible for that act. The 
wording of Article 15 (‘that act’) suggests that the international organisation involved is 
responsible for the same act as the offending State (or international organisation).
47
 It is true 
that the concept of ‘direction and control’, called normative control48 by some, can 
                                                 
43
 Ibid, para 141. 
44
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 7, 21, para 10. 
45
 Ibid. The International Law Commission has a long footnote in its Commentary to Article 7, ibid 23: see eg A 
Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati 
Cases’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 151; P Klein, ‘Responsabilité pour les faits commis dans le cadre 
d’opérations de paix et étendue du pou- voir de contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: quelques 
considérations critiques sur l’arret Behrami et Saramati’, (2007) 53 Annuaire français de droit international 43, 
55; KM Larsen, ‘Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The “Ultimate Authority and Control” Test’, 
(2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 509, 521–522; Bodeau-Livinec, Buzzini, and Villalpando 
(2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 323 (note), 329. 
46
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 14, 37, para 4. 
47
 See 7th Report by G Gaja (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) para 18.  
48
 A term borrowed from S Talmon (n 35) 405. 
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encompass cases in which an international organisation takes a decision binding its 
members.
49
 But such ‘control’ must be a case of domination over the internationally wrongful 
act and not merely the exercise of oversight, and ‘direction’ must connote ‘actual direction of 
an operative kind’.50 Responsibility relating to the adoption by an organisation of a decision 
that is binding on its members is covered under Article 17, but that article only applies to 
circumvention: the adoption of the decision by the international organisation must intend to 
take advantage of the separate legal personality of its members to avoid compliance with an 
international obligation.
51
 Because when non-directly effective provisions are in issue (for 
example, a Union Directive), Member States of the European Union can have discretion in 
how they implement binding Union acts,
52
 it would only apply if compliance with the binding 
decision ‘necessarily entails circumvention’.53 Finally, although Article 16 suggests that an 
international organisation is responsible if it coerces a State into committing an 
internationally wrongful act, the adoption of a binding decision by an international 
organisation is not considered coercion except under exceptional circumstances: nothing less 
than ‘conduct which forces the will of the coerced State will suffice, giving it no effective 
choice but to comply with the wishes of the coercive’ actor.54 
B. Regional Economic Integration Organisations, lex specialis, and the European Union 
The European Commission has long expressed ‘concerns as to the feasibility of subsuming 
all international organizations under the terms of this one draft in the light of the highly 
diverse nature of international organizations, of which the European [Union] is itself an 
                                                 
49
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 15, 38, para 4. 
50
 Ibid, quoting from the ASR (n 36) Commentary to Article 17 of the ASR, para 7, from which the principle 
was taken. 
51
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 17, 41, para 4. 
52
 See Bosphorus (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) para 157. 
53
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 17, 41, para 7. 
54
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 16, 40, para 4, citing ASR (n 36) Commentary to Artice 18, para 2. 
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example’.55 It put forward that a distinctive regime ought to apply to so-called ‘regional 
economic integration organisations’ (REIOs), in the form of special rules for attribution of 
conduct to the Union and other similar organisations; in practice, this designation would 
apply only to the Union at present.
56
 Such a differentiated approach would be justified not 
only by the Union’s exercise of certain competences, but on the notion that its Member States 
have engaged a permanent transfer of ‘sovereign powers’ relating to those competences to the 
supranational level.
57
  
Although the International Law Commission has been hostile to recognising the 
European Union as a sui generis organisation, echoing concerns from the European law 
perspective,
58
 it has nevertheless left the door open with Article 64 ARIO, which allows that 
special rules that might govern the existence of an internationally wrongful act would 
supersede the general regime under the doctrine of lex specialis. Such special rules of 
international law may be contained in the constitutive instruments of the organisation; in fact, 
the Commentary to Article 64 refers expressly to the existence of special regimes relating to 
‘the attribution to the European Community (now Union) of conduct of States members of 
the Community when they implement binding acts of the Community’.59 The ILC carefully 
                                                 
55
 International Law Commission, Sixtieth session Geneva, (5 May – 6 June and 7 July – 8 August 2007), 
Responsibility of international organizations: Comments and observations received from international 
organizations, UN Doc A/CN.4/582, 4. 
56
 D McGoldrick (n 6) 191, points out that some treaties, such as the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (entered into force 15 April 1994), 1867 UNTS 3, make special provision for the 
European Union (at Article XI), or by reference to ‘regional economic integration organisations’, which in 
practice only covers the Union. 
57
 E Paasivirta and PJKuijper (n Error! Bookmark not defined.) 188–92. 
58
 From the European law perspective, R Schütze (n 1) 1091, also takes issue with the sui generis argument for 
several reasons: 1) it lacks explanatory value, being based in conceptual tautology that asserts no room for 
analysis; 2) it views the Union in negative terms, and thus indirectly perpetuates the concept of indivisible 
sovereignty; 3) the sui generis classification fails to capture the European Union’s evolution over the last 
decades; 4) the sui generis classification is historically unfounded, as ‘[a]ll previous existing Unions of States 
lay between international and national law’. 
59
 International Law Commission, Report of its 61st Session (2009), Commentary on Article 63, UN Doc 
A/64/10, 176, para 2. See remarks by F Hoffmeister, ‘Litigating Against the European Union and its Member 
States: Who Responds under the ILC's Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International 
Organizations?’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 723, 729–730. 
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considered much of the relevant case law from the ECtHR, the WTO and the ECJ,
60
 only to 
observe laconically that the special rules governing the relations between international 
organisations and their members might be relevant in attributing responsibility between them. 
The Commentary to Article 64, moreover, makes clear that it is modelled on Article 55 of the 
ASR,
61
 the commentary to which in turn emphasises that the lex specialis derogate legi 
generali principle can only apply as between the parties to an agreement containing the 
special rule
62
. It is difficult to distil from this the possibility that the special rule or exception 
would have any objective value.  
Despite the ILC’s position, the European Union persists in emphasising that the draft 
articles, in their final form, ‘do not sufficiently address the special characteristics of the 
European Union as a regional integration organisation’.63 There is a serious conceptual flaw, 
however, in relying blindly on this argument; it would suggest that the internal rules of any 
organisation could have an objective character, binding third States, which would constitute a 
‘clear denial of the specific and internal nature of the rules of international organisation’.64 It 
would also have the effect of modifying the rights and obligations of third parties in a manner 
going far beyond the ICJ’s limited attribution of international personality to the United 
Nations in Reparation for Injuries. The concern expressed here is not to continue with the 
outdated line of reasoning that any internal rules on competence be ‘irrelevant’ in relations 
with third parties, as is the case with federal States. Such an exception ought not to be rooted 
                                                 
60
 ARIO (n 3) Commentary to Article 64, 101, paras 3–6; M & Co v Germany App no 13258/87 (ECtHR, 9 
February 1990) 138; European Communities — Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs — Complaint by the United States (“EC – Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications (US)”), WT/DS174/R; Bosphorus (n Error! Bookmark not defined.); Kokkelvisserij (n Error! 
Bookmark not defined.). 
61
 Ibid, 102, para 7. 
62
 ASR (n 36), Commentary to Article 55, 140, paras 1-2. 
63
 EU Statement - United Nations 6th Committee: Report of the International Law Commission on 
Responsibility of International Organisations, Statement on behalf of the European Union by Lucio Gussetti, 
Director, Principal Legal Adviser, European Commission, at the UN General Assembly 6th Committee (Legal) 
66th Session: Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session on 
Responsibility of International Organisations, 24 October 2011.  
64
 J d’Aspremont (n 23) 10. 
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purely in the internal rules of the European legal order.
65
 Instead, it is submitted here that the 
existence of any lex specialis as to the character of the EU’s division of competences between 
the Union and its Member States would thus be applicable in cases where the EU’s division 
of competences is recognised by third parties, much in line with the practice of the federal 
States described above. Several multilateral agreements that are open to EC/EU accession 
make specific provision for this.
66
 Moreover, Article 64 of ARIO confirms that international 
law would be able to accommodate such an exception for the EU and similar REIOs, 
provided that the Union and its Member States were able to obtain recognition of the 
European legal order in their relations with third parties.
67
  
 
IV. A NEW CONCEPTION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
 
The DARIO paradigm of apportioning responsibility according to control is reassuring to the 
international lawyer: it provides a framework for accommodating the European Union within 
existing structures, avoiding the fatuous and unhelpful sui generis categorisation, and it is 
efficient, providing an element of legal certainty. Because of international law’s insistence on 
the indivisibility of sovereignty, it is true that the European Union finds itself pushed into the 
uncomfortable conceptual duality of either being an international organisation or a federal 
                                                 
65
 Ibid, 9, referring to Ahlborn, ‘The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International 
Responsibility’, ACIL Research Paper No 2011-03 (SHARES Series), 29. 
66
 Ibid, 3, referring to art 305(1)(f) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (signed 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), 1833 UNTS 396; the 1995 Agreement Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, A.CONF.164/37 (8 
September 1995); the 1994 WTO Agreement (n 56); the Energy Charter Treaty (signed 17 December 1994, 
entered into force 16 April 1998), 2080 UNTS 95, which expressly uses the term REIO; Art 13 of the 1985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (signed 22 March 1985, entered into force 22 
September 1998), 1513 UNTS 323; Art 22 of the 2000 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (signed 29 May 1992, entered into force 4 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107; Art 34 of the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (signed 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993), 1760 UNTS 
79; Art 36 of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol in Biosafety (signed 29 January 2000, entered into force 11 
September 2003), 2226 UNTS 208; and the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (signed 31 
October 2003, entered into force 14 December 2005), 2349 UNTS 41.  
67
 F Hoffmeister (n 59) 746: ‘the conduct of a State that executes the law or acts under the normative control of 
a regional economic integration organization may be considered an act of that organization under international 
law, taking account of the nature of the organization’s external competence and its international obligations in 
the field where the conduct occurred’. He calls for an explicit acknowledgment rather than the implicit one in art 
64, 746–747. 
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State,
68
 yet without either of these categories fully capturing the overlapping conception of 
sovereignty embodied by the Union; and then, because it is not a State, by default it is 
regarded as an international organisation.
69
 If the European Union is more than a ‘mere’ 
international organisation, and in fact has created a ‘municipal order of transnational 
dimensions, of which it forms the “basic constitutional charter”’,70 more complex 
possibilities emerge beyond the control paradigm of attributing international responsibility to 
an organisation in accordance with the ARIO. For this reason, the rest of this article will 
explore a possible alternative paradigm: the European Union as a ‘federation’, a 
supranational entity under international law. If a federation can also go beyond describing 
federated entities within States (‘federal States’) and can also describe the interstices between 
an international person and a State,
71
 some careful reflection is necessary as to the wider 
implications of federations beyond States. Although it is true that most of the practice that 
will be surveyed covers sub-State federated entities, certain principles about the division of 
sovereign powers could, by analogy, apply to the European Union as a supranational federal 
entity. 
A. Federations, Federal States, and International Law 
As a general rule, international law deems as irrelevant the internal structures of federal 
States. This principle is codified in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: ‘the conduct of an organ of a territorial 
governmental entity within a State shall also be considered as an act of that State under 
international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question’.72 
                                                 
68
 R Schütze (n 1) 1092. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 See AG Maduro, Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdul Kadi v Council of EU and Commission of EC [2008] ECR I-
06351, citing Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR I-1339, para 23. 
71
 R Schütze (n 1) 1088. 
72
 ASR (n 36) 45. This reprises the essence of Article 3 of the Harvard Draft Code on International 
Responsibility (1929) 23 American Journal of International Law 131, 145: ‘a state is not relieved of 
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According to the Commission, the responsibility of the federal State is engaged by conduct 
incompatible with its international obligations, ‘irrespective of the level of administration or 
government at which the conduct occurs’.73 The principle holds even when, under internal 
law, the federal government is powerless to compel a sub-State (federated) entity to comply 
with an international obligation, as was demonstrated in the LaGrand case before the ICJ.
74
  
It should be pointed out, however, that this general principle does not exclude a fortiori 
the apportioning of joint or equal responsibility onto the federated entity, and ought best to be 
seen as neutral.
75
 Neutrality does not automatically exclude the ability of federated entities to 
conclude international agreements with outside governments that are willing to enter into 
treaty relations with them. As such, international law does not remain oblivious to the internal 
divisions of ‘federal States’76 that apportion competences normally falling to a State between 
two or more orders of government.
77
 Hence, the domestic constitutional arrangements of 
several federal States make provision for their respective federated entities to exercise a jus 
tractatuum; and in fact, several third States have willingly entered into treaty relations with 
such entities.  
                                                                                                                                                        
responsibility because an injury to an alien is attributable to one of its political subdivisions, regardless of the 
extent too which the national government, according to its constitution, has control of the subdivision.’  
73
 Ibid 39, para 5.  
74
 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Provisional Measures, [1999] ICJ Rep 9, at 16, para 28. See 
also LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Judgment, [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 495, para 81. 
75
 See I Bernier, ‘Remarks: ASIL/CCIL Joint Panel on the Conduct of International Relations in Federal States’ 
(1991) Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 132, 135. 
76
 A colourful definition of a federal State is that it is a ‘pluralistic democracy in which two sets of governments, 
neither being fully at the mercy of the other, legislate and administer within their separate and yet interlocked 
jurisdictions’: I Duchacek, ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International 
Relations’ in HJ Michelmann and P Soldatos (eds), Federalism and International Relations: The Role of 
Subnational Units (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990) 1, 3. 
77
 According to W Rudolf, ‘Federal States’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max-Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) vol III, 1136, para 4, only 18 States are properly 
constituted as federal States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United States and Venezuela. Serbia and Montenegro has since formally dissolved. To this one 
can add Belgium, a federal State in all but name. 
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B. Federated States: Practice 
There is ample practice in relation to the treaty-making power exercised by federated 
entities,
78
 but there seem to be two distinct phenotypes of federal States with respect to jus 
tractatuum: those that provide for constitutionally-defined powers for federated entities 
(called ‘open’), and those that apportion exclusive treaty-making powers onto the federal 
government (termed ‘closed’).79 These have been described elsewhere,80 but will be briefly 
surveyed here.  Amongst the ‘open’ federations, through Article 32 of the Basic Law, 
Germany’s Länder possess the right to conclude treaties with foreign States.81 Although the 
federal government can conclude treaties with respect to subjects falling within its field of 
exclusive legislative competence,
82
 it may also enter into treaties concerning subjects over 
whom it has concurrent legislative powers,
83
 or where it possesses the right to enact general 
rules.
84
 A similar arrangement may be found in Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 
Constitution of Austria, which grant the Länder an international treaty-making power, 
although this power is limited to matters falling within their exclusive competence and only 
with neighbouring States, and also subject to certain residual rights of the federal State.
85
 
Article 56, para 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Swiss Confederation provides that the 
                                                 
78
 An important work in this respect was that of L di Marzo, Component Units of Federal States and 
International Agreements (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980). 
79
 The terminology of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ federations is developed in B Fassbender, Der offene Bundesstaat 
(Tübingen, Mohr, 2006). 
80
 The practices of the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Belgium are 
canvassed in more detail in GI Hernández, ‘Federated Entities in International Law: Disaggregating the Federal 
State?’ in D French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
491, 494–500. 
81
 Treaty practice in Germany is conducted in accordance with the Lindauer Abkommen (Lindau Agreement) of 
14 November 1957 between the Federal Government and the Länder governments, reprinted in H Dreier (ed), 
Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2nd edn (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2006) vol II, 794-95, through which the Länder 
agreed to delegate their agreement-making powers so as to allow the federal government to conclude treaties in 
its own name on subjects deemed to be predominantly of federal concern. 
82
 Article 73 of the Basic Law. 
83
 So-called ‘konkurriende Gesetzgebungszuständigkeit’: Art 74 of the Basic Law. 
84
 So-called ‘Rahmengesetzgebungszuständigkeit’: Art 75 of the Basic Law. 
85
 F Cede and G Hafner, ‘Republic of Austria’ in DB Hollis, MR Blakeslee and LB Ederington (eds), National 
Treaty Law and Practice: Dedicated to the Memory of Monroe Leigh (Leiden, Brill, 2005) 59, 61. The pre-1992 
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at art 271(2), provided for a similar competence 
for the federal republics. 
 18 
cantons may conclude agreements with foreign States ‘within the scope of their powers’,86 
and Article 55 provides for cantonal participation in the negotiation of foreign policy by the 
Confederation. Finally, Belgium’s 1993 Coordinated Constitution enshrines an in foro 
interno, in foro externo principle similar to the European Union’s ‘parallel external powers’ 
principle, through which domestic divisions of competence, between both different regions as 
well as between linguistic communities, are made operative in international relations.
87
 
Accordingly, if the Flemish or Walloon regional government is competent internally for a 
given domain, in relation to the said domain it is automatically competent externally to enter 
into internationally binding agreements.
88
  
The federated entities that compose the United States
89
 and Canada,
90
 despite the treaty-
making power being an exclusive prerogative of the federal government, nevertheless engage 
in limited treaty-making. In the Canadian example, this is facilitated through a system of 
accords cadres
91
 through which the Canadian federal government and a third State together 
recognise explicitly that agreements between a Canadian province and that State will be 
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 Article 56, paras 1–2. See also: L Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution (Basel, Helbing & 
Lichtenhan, 1971) 315; and VEB 24 (1954) No 5 (Switzerland). In Switzerland, the cantons have a limited 
international legal personality (petite personnalité); the Swiss Constitution thus leaves some limited room for 
the cantons to appear as subjects of rights and duties under international law.  
87
 See arts 167–9 of the 1993 Coordinated Constitution of Belgium. 
88
 See, eg the agreements of the three Belgian regional governments with France and the Netherlands for the 
protection of the Scheldt: Belgium (Brussels-Capital, Flanders, Wallonia Regional Governments)-France-
Netherlands: Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt, Charleville Mezières (France), 26 
April 1994, (1995) 34 ILM 854 (Scheldt); (1995) 34 ILM 859 (Meuse). Art 9 of each of the two agreements 
requires each of the regional governments separately to notify France upon the completion of their required 
domestic procedures for entry into force, ibid, 858.  
89
 The Constitution of the United States of America, art 1, s 10, cl 3, provides that ‘no state shall, without the 
consent of Congress … enter into any agreement or compact with … a foreign power’. 
90
 British North America Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, ch 3, (also ‘Constitution Act 1867’, name changed by the 
Constitution Act 1982, itself Sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), ch 11), s 91 (enumerating federal powers) and 
s 92 (enumerating provincial powers)). S. 132 of the British North America Act 1867 assigns to the federal 
Parliament ‘all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, 
as part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries arising under Treaties between the Empire and such 
Foreign Countries’ (emphasis added). 
91
 Canada insists on these accords-cadre, hand refuses to recognise its provinces’ international agreements as 
such unless it has consented to them: see M Copithorne, ‘Canada’ in DB Hollis, MR Blakeslee and LB 
Ederington (eds), National Treaty Law and Practice: Dedicated to the Memory of Monroe Leigh (Leiden & 
Boston, Brill, 2005) 91, 103.  
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binding under international law
92
. The United States follows a similar practice, although US 
states have occasionally concluded unauthorised agreements with foreign federated entities,
93
 
usually Canadian provinces, a recent example being Missouri and Manitoba in 2000.
94
 Thus, 
constitutional authorisation is not as such required for international treaty-making by the non-
State legal order in a federation. 
One common facet unifies these varied examples: the internal power to enter into 
international agreements is bereft of legal effect unless a willing treaty partner may be found 
who is willing to recognise the internally-determined capacity of the federated entities to 
allow for bilateral relationships between third parties and a federated entity. In short, there 
must be a willingness and recognition from prospective treaty partners to regard the federated 
entity as capable of entering into treaty relations, which is a question of international law.
95
 
There is no question that a domestic constitutional provision by itself would suffice to create 
international legal personality for a federated entity: it is only when both these cumulative 
conditions are met that the federated entity could be regarded as having some form of 
international legal personality, one essentially relative vis-à-vis foreign States that recognise 
                                                 
92
 An example of this is the Franco-Canadian Cultural Agreement (France-Canada), 17 November 1965, Can TS 
1965/21, reprinted in (1965) 17 External Affairs (Canada) 514, which has allowed for Quebec and France to 
enter into a number of agreements: see eg the exchange of letters, dated 23 and 27 December 1963, between the 
French Ambassador in Ottawa and the Department of External Affairs of Canada (in respect of technical co-
operation); and exchange of letters, dated 27 February 1965, between the Secretary of State of External Affairs 
of Canada and the French chargé d’affaires (in respect of cultural affairs).  
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 The US Supreme Court stated in Virginia v Tennessee (1893) 148 US 503, 518, that the prohibition against 
the conclusion of ‘treaties’ found in art I, s 10 of the United States Constitution did not apply to agreements 
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build up the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the 
United States’.  
94
 The earliest example being North Dakota’s administrative interstate agreements with Canadian municipalities, 
upheld by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in McHendry County et al v Brady 37 North Dakota 59, (1917) 
163 NW 540 (United States). In 2000, Missouri concluded a Memorandum of Agreement with Manitoba on 
water issues without Congressional authorisation: see the letter from William H Taft IV, the Legal Adviser to 
the US Department of State, to Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota ‘Capacity to Make: Role of Individual 
States of the United States: Analysis of Memorandum of Understanding between Missouri and Manitoba’ 2001 
Digest A (United States), 179–98. See also: I Duchacek, ‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New 
Actors in International Relations’ in HJ Michelmann and P Soldatos (eds), Federalism and International 
Relations: The Role of Subnational Units (Oxford, Clarendon, 1990) 1, 20, which also mentions the jointly 
financed water development in the Souris River Basin, linking Saskatchewan, North Dakota and Manitoba. 
95
 See GJ Perrin, Droit international public: sources, sujets, caractéristiques (Zürich, Schulthess, 1999), 562; J 
Salmon, ‘Conclusions’ in Les États fédéraux dans les relations internationales (Brussels, Bruylant, 1984) 505, 
507.  
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that entity. In the absence of such recognition, the internal structures of the federal State 
become immaterial.  
 
V. MIXED AGREEMENTS: TOWARDS SHARED/JOINT RESPONSIBILITY? 
A. Recognition 
i. The Multiplicity of Treaty-making Powers under European Law 
If one compares the treaty practice of federal States with that of the European Union, one of 
the most interesting parallels relates to practice. The fact that, under European law, Member 
States no longer enjoy plenary treaty-making powers is in contrast with the view under public 
international law, where European treaty obligations are no more, and no less, than delegated 
treaty powers. This divergence raises serious questions as to the certainty of obligations and 
the ability of a government to bind itself at international law. European Union law has 
developed a number of mechanisms through which it enhances the predictability and stability 
of its treaty agreements with third States: 
Shared competence (Articles 4(1) and (2) TFEU): by contrast, shared competence 
both the Union and the Member States may assume international obligations, but where the 
latter may only exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not (Article 2(2) 
TEU). Both are seen to enjoy competence over a given field; however, once the Union has 
exercised its competence, the Member States may no longer exercise theirs. In the case of 
conflict between European Union acts and pre-existing acts of the Member States, the latter 
acts are ‘disapplied’.96  
Concurrent powers (Article 4(4) TFEU) between the Union and the Member States, 
where the Union’s competence to enter into agreements does not affect the competence of the 
                                                 
96
 R Schütze, ‘Supremacy Without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emerging Doctrine of Community Pre-
emption’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1023, 1028–9. The principle of disapplication is embodied in Case 106/77, 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629.  
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Member States to conclude agreements in the same field.
97
 Both the Union and the Member 
States may independently enter into treaty relations without necessarily consulting one 
another. In practice, under Article 4(4) TFEU these concurrent powers are the exception 
rather than the rule, and are limited to development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Article 
209(2) TFEU, accordingly, allows the Union to conclude international agreements with ‘third 
countries and competent international organisations’ on questions of development 
cooperation, ‘without prejudice’ to Member States’ competence to negotiate in international 
bodies and to conclude agreements on similar issues. The practice of concurrent powers was 
broader in earlier treaty provisions: for example, Article 6(2) of the TEU required that the EU 
join alongside, rather than supersede, Member States in the realm of human rights.  
Finally, there are other possible modes of treaty-making, exercised by both the Union 
and its Member States on the international level: complementary competences, where the 
Union may set minimum standards but where Member States can go beyond that standard;
98
 
and coordinating competences, where the Union level may provide an ‘elastic framework of 
orientations’ but where Member States may choose how to implement policy.99 Yet another 
mode, of joint competence, where the Union must act jointly with the Member States, was 
abolished in the Treaty of Lisbon.
100
  
In order to accommodate these complex variations in relation to competence, the 
long-standing practice of the Community and then the Union has been to enter into ‘mixed 
agreements’, through which the EU and some/all of its members appear as contracting parties 
                                                 
97
 R Schütze, ‘The European Community’s Federal Order of Competences—A Retrospective Analysis’ in 
Dougan and Currie (eds) 50 Years of the European Treaties (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 63, 74–5, points 
out that the concurrent nature of these competences is only temporary: as the Union begins to exercise 
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 From the EC Treaty (n 6), arts 175–6 EC (environmental policy) and 137 EC (social policy); Art 153 
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 Articles 2 and 5 TFEU (n 10); R Schütze, ‘Lisbon and the Federal Order of Competences: a Prospective 
Analysis’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 709, 717, characterises coordinating competences as normatively 
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100
 See, eg art 35 EC, relating to the CAP, 180 EC, which obliges the Community and Member States to 
coordinate their policies on development and cooperation and art 133(6) EC, on trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services and social and human health services. 
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with third States.
101
 Under mixed agreements, both the Union and its Member States are seen 
as having assumed an international obligation that parallels the internal delineation of 
competence between them, which can lead to varying modes and degrees for liability for the 
different levels of governance.
102
 One would think that these mixed agreements would 
constitute recognition of the exclusive rights of the Union to act internationally, as well as its 
exclusive responsibility in the case of a breach.
103
 But this is not always the case: practice 
relating to the WTO Agreement, to which both the European Union and its Member States 
are now parties, demonstrates the difficulties in accommodating the internal division of 
competences between the European Union and its Member States. 
ii. Limitations to the Exclusivity Approach: The World Trade Organisation 
With explicit special provision for the European Community/Union and its laws,
104
 the 
WTO’s practice clearly confirms the Union’s capacity to respond to claims for its activities 
falling within its competence.
105
 The WTO’s practice suggests that it is prepared, although 
not without some difficulties, to allow the Union to stand and to exclude the responsibility of  
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 R Schütze (n 21) 80, who recalls that the first mixed agreement concluded by the EEC was the 1961 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece [1963] OJ 
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102
 F Hoffmeister (n 59) 744. 
103
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 F Hoffmeister (n 59) 730. See also: P Eeckhout, ‘The EU and its Members States in the WTO – Issues of 
Responsibility’ in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2006) 449. 
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its Member States.
106
 In EC-LAN, although it merged complaints lodged against the United 
Kingdom and Ireland into a single claim against the Union, the WTO DSB fell short of 
declaring that the EU would be solely responsible for breaches, instead presuming an 
identical international obligation for the Member States.
107
 This could be seen as an 
endorsement of a theory of joint responsibility of the Union and the Member States.
108
 The 
WTO DSB is prepared to attribute exclusive responsibility to the Union when applicable: in 
EC-Customs,
109
 the WTO Panel, in considering the application and administration of the 
Community’s customs regulations by Member States, concluded that the customs union fell 
within the exclusive competence of the Community.
110
 Similarly, in EC-Geographic 
Indications, the Panel concluded that Member States act ‘de facto as organs of the 
Community, for which the Community would be responsible under WTO law and 
international law in general’.111 The WTO panels in EC-Asbestos and EC-Biotech concluded 
similarly that in those disputes, measures taken by Member States had been defended by the 
Union alone, and that responsibility for these measures was attributable to it.
112
 Taken as a 
whole, these decisions suggest a willingness in apportioning exclusive responsibility to the 
European Union when appropriate, as would be the case under a strict control approach 
through the ARIO. Yet outside a clear multilateral agreement like the WTO Agreement, an 
‘exclusivity’ approach to responsibility presents particular challenges for accommodating the 
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European Union, even when recognition of the Union’s division of competences is embodied 
in an international agreement. 
B. Shared or Joint Responsibility 
Mixed agreements take the European conception and project it onto the international plane. 
When the Union and its Member States both conclude an international agreement, they are in 
essence ‘uniting’ their competence under European law;113 Member States are guaranteeing 
the certainty that the obligation will be performed.
114
 Accordingly, the practice of mixed 
agreements has thrived, despite the broadening of the Union’s exclusive powers through the 
parallelism doctrine, and it is not motivated by the policy preference that Member States wish 
to remain ‘visible’ on the international scene.115 Sheer pragmatism favours the use of mixed 
agreements in order to ensure recognition of the European Union’s internal arrangements as 
binding on third States. 
Given this practice, the concept of shared responsibility
116
 might help to give 
conceptual clarity to the European Union’s international personality. Within the European 
legal order, it is already a settled matter that the Union may bear joint or separate 
responsibility alongside its Member States.
117
 Yet at international law, shared or joint 
responsibility is very much the exception, and exclusive responsibility and the relevant 
articles in the Draft Articles tend to emphasise paradigms of control and indirect 
responsibility. Under such circumstances recognition by third States of the European 
structure of apportioning powers and competences would be a requirement to move beyond 
viewing international responsibility than the insistence of the State as a ‘black box’. Nothing 
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is exceptional about developing such a practice: as described above,
118
 it is accommodated 
within the application of Article 64 ARIO.  
 
C. Who Responds? Primary and Subsidiary Responsibility 
A further point is relevant on a practical level. In the light of the possibility that both the 
European Union and its Member States can be simultaneously responsible for the breach of 
an international obligation, to whom is the injured party or State to address a claim? It seems 
unduly harsh to penalise the aggrieved party for the complex internal arrangements favoured 
by the Union, but to give it unfettered choice also has substantial drawbacks. The 
Commentary to Article 48, paragraph 1 of the ARIO relies on the Parliament v Council 
judgment of the ECJ,
119
 and concludes that if an international organisation and one or more 
States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the responsibility of each 
State and the international organisation may be invoked in relation to that act: they are jointly 
liable.
120
 Paragraph 2 is even more interesting: ‘subsidiary responsibility may be invoked 
insofar as the invocation of the primary responsibility has not led to reparation’. In practice, 
this means that the subsidiarily responsible entity may only be pursued if the primarily 
responsible organisation fails to provide reparation, and when it is clear as to how the 
apportioning of responsibility can proceed. An example of this may be when an international 
organization has committed a wrongful act that triggers the responsibility of a Member State. 
Although responsibility of Member States is not presumed to exist as such, such a general 
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principle would render nugatory the international personality of an organization.
121
 However, 
under very limited circumstances, a State may be presumed to have subsidiary liability, for 
example if it has accepted liability explicitly,
122
 or if the conduct of Member States has led a 
third party to rely on the responsibility of Member States.
123
 Such presumed subsidiary 
liability is of course rebuttable.
124
 
 Two approaches can be taken when a breach of an obligation may be attributed either 
to a Member State or to the Union. One could be to suggest that the formation of the Union 
creates an ‘inherent risk’ for Member States, that they could be powerless to comply with an 
international obligation because of their conflicting obligations under Union law. Under this 
line of reasoning, the Member States would be unable to invoke European Union law to 
evade their international obligations. This seems to be the general regime favoured in the 
ARIO, with exceptions being made only when third parties recognise European Union law, as 
they do in the WTO Agreement or the LOSC. More interesting is the second scenario, and to 
conceive of situations where a claim could be addressed to the Union under a mixed 
agreement recognising the Union’s competences in certain fields. Returning to risk for a 
moment, any ‘inherent risk’ relating to the formation of the Union is then assumed by any 
foreign State or entity that enters into an agreement with the Union or its Member States as to 
the recourses available to it in case of a breach.
125
 In such cases, the conduct would first have 
to be attributed to a Member State or to the Union; yet this risk cannot apply in situations of 
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concurrent, shared or mixed competences, where both the Union and the Member States 
could conceivably act separately, or they could be acting jointly. 
 Thus, a paradigm of subsidiary responsibility could help to resolve the conflict.
126
 In 
complex situations of overlapping competence, the injured party could feel free to address the 
claim to either the Union or any relevant Member States, guaranteeing the international 
personality recognised in a mixed agreement, and relieving the dispute-settlement body or 
court from having to apportion responsibility between the Union and its Member States. Such 
an overlapping conception of sovereignty suggests that the Member States act as a 
‘guarantor’ of the Union’s conduct, having transferred sovereign powers to it. It would not 
needlessly muddle the conceptual framework;
127
 it would merely encourage third parties to 
recognise the Union’s internal structure and engage with the appropriate order of 
government, safe in the knowledge that such engagement would not allow the Union or its 
Member States to evade their international obligations.  
D. Case Study: ECHR Accession 
The paradigm of shared responsibility seems to be strongly favoured in the proposed 
agreement for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Although it is true that violations of international human rights obligations do not 
always automatically entail the international responsibility for that violation in the traditional 
sense, the conceptual paradigm of shared responsibility is a useful comparator. Up to the 
present, and perhaps due to its basic mission to provide effective human rights protection,
128
 
the ECtHR has generally declined to attribute EU Member States obligations to the Union 
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and declare claims to be inadmissible (although see Behrami and Saramati).
129
 If anything, it 
has held EU Member States responsible for violations of the Convention found in the EU’s 
primary treaties.
130
 This may be due to the inability of the EU to appear as a respondent in 
Strasbourg;. it has been argued that the WTO and the ITLOS are more prepared to attribute 
conduct to the Union and not the Member States, given the Union’s willingness and capacity 
to appear as respondent before those two institutions.
131
 At present, the EU’s inability to 
appear before the European Court of Human Rights strongly distinguishes it from these 
institutions.
132
 
The proposed accession agreement of the EU to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, in application of Article 1 of Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, which stipulates that 
any accession agreement preserve the specific characteristics of the Union and its law, by 
ensuring that the correct respondent be addressed by any claim to the Court.
133
 From the 
perspective of international law, what is relevant for our purposes is the idea that the 
normative control exercised by the Union over Member States will be recognised, both by the 
ECHR system but also by ECHR States Parties that are not members of the EU, as a criterion 
for the attribution of conduct.
134
 What is more, the ECHR accession proposal includes the 
interesting procedural mechanism of ‘co-respondent’, through which the Union and its 
members can be held, as fully parties to the case, ‘jointly responsible’135 for violations of the 
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Convention and bound by any judgment of the ECtHR.
136
 Although appearing as co-
respondent is purely voluntary,
137
 in cases where the Member States and the Union appear as 
co-respondents, the Court would have to consider, whether an allegation against them ‘calls 
into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of European 
Union law, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an 
obligation under European Union law’.138 The issue is not who is competent, but whether a 
given provision of EU law is at the origin of the breach.
139
 
There seem to be sound reasons of principle justifying the co-respondent approach and 
the emphasis on shared responsibility. Giorgio Gaja has suggested that the main purpose of 
allowing the Union to become a co-respondent is ‘to defend what it considers to be the proper 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of EU law and of the ECHR’.140 Criticism exists: it 
has been suggested that the Union’s accession to the ECHR will ‘internalise’ ECHR law in 
EU law, and as such will not qualify them as lex specialis,
141
 and that the voluntary nature of 
the Union’s participation in proceedings undermines systemic considerations and the possible 
development of clear rules.
142
 For all this, it cannot be denied that EU law, whatever its 
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constitutional nature and status as an autonomous legal order, nevertheless remains subject to 
the application of international law in relation to human rights. ECHR law may be 
‘internalised’, but it remains essentially ‘external’, part of a wider corpus of international law 
that need not be fraught with irreconcilable conflict.
143
 Moreover, as the Council of Europe’s 
Steering Group has suggested, the co-respondent mechanism as a means to avoid lacunae in 
participation, accountability and enforceability of the Convention,
144
 noting that it is a 
‘special feature of the EU legal system that acts adopted by its institutions may be 
implemented by its Member States and, conversely, that provisions of the EU founding 
treaties agreed upon by its Member States may be implemented by institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies of the EU’.145 It has been suggested that the attribution of joint 
responsibility allows the European Court to be unburdened of the delicate task of 
apportioning responsibility between the Union and its Member States based on the 
distribution of competences between them: for the Court to do so would nearly certainly have 
interpretative consequences within the European legal order,
146
 and thus undermine the 
autonomy of EU law.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
There are unfortunately few signs that international law is moving beyond its traditional 
insistence on the State as the ‘natural’ form of international person. Yet the conceptual 
challenge posed by an unusual international person like the European Union in international 
relations remains interesting: besides being able to subscribe to internationally binding 
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commitments, or be held responsible for breaches or non-compliance with international law, 
the European Union possesses sovereign powers over territories and peoples that are already 
represented by a State. This overlapping, or interlocked, conception of sovereignty opens new 
possibilities that international lawyers can, and must, accommodate creatively. 
What separates the European Union from traditional international organisations is the 
extent to which its competences and powers cross over into the internal sphere. Transcending 
the control of its Member States, and sometimes with the power to compel them against their 
wishes to comply with a Union obligation, the European Union constitutes an experiment 
where sovereignty is divided between national and supranational levels. In this respect, it is a 
‘federation’, akin to but not necessarily identical to a federal State.147 As such, a divided 
sovereignty raises interesting wider questions and opens the door to the possibility of shared 
or joint responsibility.  
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